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THE INJURED TIIRD PARTY IN CALIFORNIA:
EXTENDING BAD FAITH FOR FULL
COMPENSATION
INTRODUCTION
The insurer's bargaining position is naturally superior to the insured's
bargaining position. The insurer controls the terms of the policy and the
payment of claims. Consequently, the insured is at the insurer's mercy and is
unprotected from the insurer's unfair practices.
The insured must accept the insurer's refusal to pay a claim. For example,
an injured insured submits a claim to the insurer. Although the claim is within
the terms of the policy, the insurer may refuse to pay the claim. The courts
have tried to strengthen the position of the insured by allowing the insured to sue
the insurer for bad faith.' However, the bad faith suit has merely shifted the
imbalance between the insured and the insurer. In some circumstances, the
insured may submit incomplete or false information, or delay in submitting
information to the insurer. In response, the courts have allowed the insurer to
raise the conduct of the insured as a defense to liability under the policy. This
defense is called comparative bad faith.
Third parties are particularly disadvantaged by the insured's bad faith suit.
Many conflicts concerning the payment of insurance claims involve a third
party, who is not a party to the insurance contract. For instance, a third party
who is injured by the insured in an automobile collision is without sufficient
recourse when the insurer refuses to honor a claim for the injuries submitted by
the third party.
In California, third parties are precluded from directly suing the insurer
because the third party is not a party to the insurance policy, and privity is not
present between the insurer and the third party. Without the requisite element
of privity, the third party may not directly sue the insurer based on the theory
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. This Note argues that
in California, a third party should have a cause of action for bad faith against
the insurer for nonpayment of the third party's claim. This Note proposes a
statutory basis for a third party cause of action.

1. Bad faith refers to the breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in the
insurance policy. See infra notes 5-10 and accompanying text.
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In establishing a third party's right to maintain a cause of action against the
insurer for bad faith, an imbalance is created between the insurer and the third
party. The statute proposed by this Note includes a provision that limits the
liability of the insurer when sued for bad faith by a third party. This limitation
will establish a balance in third party suits similar to that which exists in first
party suits between the insured and the insurer.
Part I of this Note will discuss the tort of bad faith and its relation to both
contract and tort law. Bad faith will be analyzed in the context of insurance,
and its development in California will be illustrated. 2 Part II will establish that
the relationship between the insurer and the third party makes the need for a
private third party cause of action compelling. 3 This Note will then propose a
statutory cause of action to allow third parties to recover against the insurers,
while also placing a limitation on the third party's recovery. 4
I.

BACKGROUND

A. Bad FaithDefined
Bad faith is the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing found in every contract. 5 The duty of good faith and fair dealing is a
duty that is imposed on the parties to a contract to deal with each other fairly,
honestly, and in good faith. 6 Good faith requires that neither party will injure
the other party's right to receive the benefits of the contract.7 The duty of good
faith and fair dealing operates as a matter of law," and is independent of all
other contractual obligations. 9 In an insurance contract, for instance, the duty

2. See infra notes 5-87 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 88-169 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 170-78 and accompanying text.
5. Matthew E. Karanian, Note, California Casualty General Insurance Co. v. Superior Court:
BadFaithForAll, 18 PAC. LJ. 307, 314 (1986).
6. 1 JOHN C. MCCARTHY, RECOVERY OF DAMAGEs FOR BAD FAITH § 1.7 (5th ed. 1990)
(citing Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967); Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins.
Co., 328 P.2d 198 (Cal. 1958); Merlo v. Standard Life & Accident Ins. Co., 130 Cal. Rptr. 416
(Ct. App. 1976); Jarchow v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 122 Cal. Rptr. 470 (Ct. App. 1975);
Grand Sheet Metal Prods. Co. v. Protection Mut. Ins. Co., 375 A.2d 428 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1977);
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Reserve Ins. Co., 373 A.2d 339 (N.H. 1977)).
7. 1 McCARTHY, supra note 6, § 1.7.
8. Gnzenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032, 1037 (Cal. 1973) (the implied covenant is
"the obligation, deemed to be imposed by the law, under which the insurer must act fairly and in
good faith in discharging its contractual responsibilities"). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1981).
9. Gnienberg, 510 P.2d at 1040. For example, an insurer must honor the duty of good faith
and fair dealing in addition to not breaching the terms of the contract itself.
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If the insurer breaches the duty of good faith and fair dealing,

and the insured breaches the terms of the policy, the insurer will not be excused
from liability for a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing."I
Bad faith does not refer to any particular type of conduct.' 2 In California,

bad faith refers strictly to the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing and the resulting liability and does not depend on the absence or
presence of certain conduct. 3 In an insurance context, bad faith refers to the
denial of an insurance claim without a reasonable basis."
The breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is not restricted
to contract law, but also draws on tort law.' 5 Contract remedies are more
10. Id.

11. Id.
12. In California, bad faith does not require that the insurer acted in a malicious or immoral
manner. Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 582 P.2d 980, 986 n.5 (Cal. 1978). See also Mello v.
Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal., 187 Cal. Rptr. 168 (Ct. App. 1983) ("the lack of good faith will
be established when the insurer shall 'erroneously' or 'improperly' fail to abide by the [insurance]
policy's promises
.. actual... misconduct is not required").
13. I M CARTHY, supra note 6, § 1.9. Some jurisdictions, like California, do not require the
absence or presence of conduct by the insurer. Id. Otherjurisdictions, such as Alabama, Arkansas,
Florida, North Carolina, and Ohio require the insurer to have acted with a dishonest purpose. Id.
Other jurisdictions require conduct that is short of ill will or just a lack of reasonable basis for the
insurer to deny the claim. Id.
14. McCormick v. Sentinel Life Ins. Co., 200 Cal. Rptr. 732, 739 (Ct. App. 1984) (an insurer
may breach the covenant of good faith if "the insurer unreasonably withholds policy benefits due
under a policy"). See also Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032, 1038 (Cal. 1973) ('when
the insurer unreasonably and in bad faith withholds payment of the claim of its insured, it is subject
to liability in tort"). In California, an insured must prove that the insurer's 'erroneous decision not
to pay a claim was made unreasonably and without proper cause." Guy 0. Komblum, Defending
an Insurance Bad Faith Action, 20 THE BRIEF 47, 48 (1991). See also id. at 52 n.1l (citing
Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 686 P.2d 1158 (Cal. 1984)). Other
conduct that has indicated bad faith includes: 'failure to investigate a claim thoroughly, failure to
evaluate a claim objectively, unjustified delay in payment of a claim, abusive or coercive practices
to compel compromise of a claim, improper refusal to defend an insured, and improper handling of
defense of insured, resulting in loss of goodwill." Kornblum, supra, at 49 (extensive list of types
of conduct that have indicated bad faith).
15. ROBERT H. JERRY II, UNDERSTANDINGINSURANCE LAW § 25G, at 120 (1987). A primary
motivation for recognizing tort duties in insurance was because contract remedies were inadequate.
Id. See also Gruenberg, 510 P.2d at 1036 (holding that the breach of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing sounds in both contract and tort). The court's award of damages in Gruenbergfor emotional
distress solidified the principle that tort damages, including punitive damages, would be awarded for
bad faith. JERRY, supra, § 25G, at 120.
A claim for bad faith usually involves a three tiered analysis: contractual liability, extracontractual liability, and punitive damages. GUY 0. KORNBLUM Er AL., CALIFORNIA PRACTICE
GUIDE: BAD FAITH § 1:88 (RG 1990) [hereinafter BAD FArrIH].
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restricted than tort remedies.' 6 Contract law traditionally compensates the
promisee for loss resulting from the promisor's breach. 7 Contract damages
generally put the injured party in the same position he would have been in had
the contract been performed.'
In contrast, tort law compensates the injured
party for all harm proximately caused, whether or not the harm was in the
reasonable contemplation of the parties.' 9
An insured may recover contractual damages for the insurer's failure to

settle the insured's claim. However, the insurance policy must cover the
insured's claim.' The insured will receive the benefits under the policy if the
insurer is found to have contractual liability.2'
An insured may also recover extra-contractual damages

2

for breach of the

16. JERRY, supra note 15, § 25G, at 120. If applied flexibly, contract law could go a long way
to fully compensate an insured for the insurer's breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. Id. However, contract remedies do not compensate for emotional distress. Id. The
insured frequently suffers emotional distress when the insurer's nonpayment of a claim puts the
insured's financial well-being in jeopardy. Id.
The special relationship between the insured and the insurer also further supports imposing
tort remedies for bad faith. Id. See infra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
17. LoN L. FULIER & MELVIN ARON EISENBERO, BAstc CoNTRAcr LAW 182 (5th ed. 1981).
The terms "promisor" and "promisee" are frequently used in contract law to refer to the parties to
the contract that was breached. Generally, courts award damages for breach of contract that give
the injured party the "benefit of the bargain," or a monetary amount equivalent to the value of
performance of the breached contract. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 1.56. Contract remedies are
generally limited to damages that are foreseeable when the contract was executed. Hadley v.
Baxcndale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). Hadley is strictly construed to "limit damages to those
specifically related to the rights and duties set forth in the contract." Chris Michael Kallianos, Note,
Bad Faith Refisal to Pay First-PartyInsurance Claims: A Growing Recognition of Extra-Contract
Damages, 64 N.C. L. REV. 1421, 1422 (1986). Breach of contract damages generally do not
include damages for emotional distress. JOHN D. CALAMARi & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF
CONTRAcTs 596 (3d ed. 1987). Punitive damages are also not awarded for a breach of contract
unless the breach involved a tort. Id.
18. FULLER & EISENBERO, supra note 17, at 183.
19. 1 McCARTHY, supra note 6, § 1.56 (comparing tort damages to contract damages). Tort
damages include damages for emotional distress and economic loss. WILLIAM L. PROSSER E AL.,
TORTs 509 (8th ed. 1988). Economic loss includes loss of future earnings. Id. Emotional distress
damages include suffering prior to trial and after trial. Id. See generallyid. at 510 n.7 & 511 n.8
(listing damage awards for emotional distress including loss of taste and smell, fear of injury, fear
of developing cancer, and scars and disfigurement).
20. BAD FAITH, supra note 15, § 1:88.1; see generallyid. §2:2-2:24 for a thorough discussion
concerning the contractual liability of the insurer to the insured.
21. Kornblum, supra note 14, at 48.
22. Extra-contractual damages for bad faith refers to damages that are recoverable under a tort
measure of damages and are above and beyond what is payable under the contract. BAD FAirt,
supra note 15, § 1:4. Consequently, compensatory damages for bad faith include all damages
proximately caused by the insurer's bad faith conduct, including emotional distress, economic loss,
and attorney's fees. Id. Punitive damages are included in extra-contractual damages. Id.
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covenant of good faith and fair dealing if the insured can prove the elements of
a tort or a statutory claim.' These extra-contractual damages focus on the
manner in which the insurer failed to fully perform its duties under the insurance
policy.' Extra-contractual damages are awarded because bad faith sounds in
tort.' Insureds are allowed to recover compensatory damages that include all
damages proximately caused, regardless of whether such damages were
foreseeable when the contract was executed.'
An insured will be able to
recover for emotional distress when suing an insurer for bad faith; however, the
insured may not be required to meet all the elements of the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress.'
The list of injuries for which the insured may be compensated is
incomplete. The list of compensable injuries includes emotional distress,

The damages for bad faith will generally not include punitive damages unless the insured can
show the appropriate conduct by the insurer. In California, punitive damages are awarded when the
insured shows that the insurer acted with intent to "vex, injure, or annoy, or with a conscious
disregard of the [insured's] rights." Fleming v. Safeco Ins. Co., 206 Cal. Rptr. 313, 320 (Ct. App.
1984). Not all jurisdictions require the same conduct as California for punitive damages. 1
McCARTify, supra note 6, § 1.66. Most jurisdictions that recognize bad faith require a showing
of somne type of willful or aggravated conduct by the insurer. Id. This type of conduct is above
and beyond the level of conduct by the insurer in a bad faith breach that would result in an award
of compensatory damages. For criticisms of the award of punitive damages in bad faith actions, see
generally Jerome Murray & Michael Maillet, Extra-contractualRemedies andPunitiveDamages in
First-PartyInsuranceClaims, 53 INS. CouNs. J. 251, 252 (1986) (considering that punitive damages
have been characterized as a subversion of justice and as a windfall to insureds).
23. Kornblum, supra note 14, at 48. See infra notes 126-32 and accompanying text.
24. BAD FArH, supra note 15, J 1:88.2.
25. See Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967) (Mrs. Crisci was awarded tort
damages for emotional distress because the insurer's breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing constituted a tort). See infra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
26. Compensatory damages in tort represent the closest financial equivalent "of the loss suffered
by the plaintiff, and restore him to the position he occupied before the tort." PROSSER, supra note
19, at 503. See also Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032, 1041 (Cal. 1973) ("general rule
of damages in tort is that the injured party may recover for all detriment caused whether it could
have been anticipated or not"); Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 94 (Ct.
App. 1970) ("permitting recovery for all proximately caused detriment in a single cause of action
...engenders public respect for the judicial process'). See generally I MCCARTHY, supra note
6, § 1.56. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
27. Gruenberg, 510 P.2d at 1041. All elements of mental distress do not have to be shown
when another theory for the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is also
alleged. In Gruenberg, the insured did not have to prove outrageous conduct (an element of
emotional distress) because the insured had suffered an economic loss apart from emotional distress.
d. at 1040.
28. See supra note 18. See also White v. Western Title Ins. Co., 710 P.2d 309 (Cal. 1985)
(insured awarded emotional distress damages because title insurer failed to report awater easement);
Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 521 P.2d 1103 (Cal. 1974) (insurer was liable to insured for
emotional distress due to insurer's refusal to pay insured's medical bills); Fletcher v. Western Nat'l
Life Ins. Co., 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (Ct. App. 1970) (insured awarded damages for emotional distress
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economic loss,' all expenses incurred by the insurer in pursuing a valid claim,
and the reasonable value of the insured's time and expenses in conferring with
an attorney in pursuing a bad faith claim." The individual set of facts in each
case will1 determine if the insurer breached the duty of good faith and fair
dealing.

3

B. Breach of the Insurance Contract
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing imposes duties on both
the insurer and the insured.32 The insurer has the duty not to withhold policy
benefits from the insured33 and to accept reasonable settlements in order to
avoid exposing the insured to the risk of excess liability.' The insured has a
duty to cooperate with the insurer's investigation of the insured's claim,3 s and
the insured must not conceal or misrepresent material facts to the insurer when
presenting a claim.'
Consequently, the insurance policy creates a special relationship between
the insured and the insurer. 37 The fiduciary relationship between the insured
and the insurer is the key element justifying the use of tort remedies for the
insurer's breach of the contractual obligation.' When an insured signs an

because the insurer refused to make payments under the policy and attempted to induce the insured
to surrender the policy).
29. Gruenberg, 510 P.2d at 1040 (insured awarded damages for loss of earnings).
30. Jarchow v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 122 Cal. Rptr. 470 (Ct. App. 1975) (attorney's
fees and costs of lawsuit provided a sufficient guarantee that the insured suffered emotional distress
to warrant damages awarded for emotional distress). See generally I MCCARTHY, supra note 6, §
1.57.
31. 1 McCARTHY, supra note 6, § 1.56.
32. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
33. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d at 1032, 1037 (Cal. 1973).
34. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 176-77 (Cal. 1967). The duty to settle
reasonably within the monetary limits of the insurance policy is imposed on the insurer when a third
party presents a claim to the insurer. Id. at 176-77.
35. The insured's failure to cooperate with the insurer's investigation allows the insurer to assert
breach of contract as a defense, but will not preclude the insured's suit for bad faith. BAD FAITH,
supra note 15, § 10:38. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. However, the insured's refusal
to cooperate can also constitute a bad faith refusal to cooperate. Id. See inffra notes 73-74 and
accompanying text.
36. California Cas. Gen. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 218 Cal. Rptr. 817, 822-23 (Ct. App.
1985).
37. JERRY, supranote 15, § 25G, at 121. Adding the insurance contract to the list of contracts
that create special relationships seems logical because of the public interest aspects of the insuredinsurer relationship. Id. The breach of contracts that impose special duty, such as innkeeper-guest,
bailor-bailee and common carrier-passenger, have also resulted in tort liability when breached. Id.
See infra note 53.
38. JERRY, supra note 15, § 25G, at 123.
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insurance contract, the insured gives the insurer the exclusive power to settle
claims presented by the insured." Thus, the special relationship between the
insured and the insurer makes the judiciary more willing to intervene in

insurance contract disputes and impose tort liability for the breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.'
The courts are also motivated to apply tort remedies for the breach of an
insurance contract because of the inadequacies of contract remedies 4" to
compensate insureds and deter insurers from not performing contractual
obligations."2 Contract remedies are inadequate for two reasons. First, the
cost of bringing a suit against the insurer may be more detrimental to the insured
than acquiescing to the insurer's demands.4 3 Liability for the breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in an insurance contract is an
incentive to the insurer to consider the vulnerability of the insured.'
The
prospect of tort liability encourages the insurer to spend a relatively small
amount of the insurer's money to settle a claim, in order to prevent the insured
from being subject to a substantial loss.'5

39. Insureds usually purchase insurance policies with the intention that the insurer will litigate
any claims against the insured. Marvin F. Milich, The Evolution of the Ton of Bad Faith Breach
of Contract: Current Trends and Future Trepidation,94 COM. L.J. 418, 420 (1989).
40. Karanian, supra note 5, at 313. See also Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565, 579 (Ariz.
1986) (because of the special relationship between the insured and the insurer, the insured can
recovertort damageswhen the insurer breaches the implied covenantof good faith and fair dealing).
41. In the mid-1900s, courts realized that contract damages as the only remedy for a breach of
the insurance policy would benefit the insurer. Michael J. Gainer, The Ovemding of Royal Globe:
A "Royal Bonanza"forInsuranceCompanies, But What Happens Now?, 16 PEPP. L. REv. 763,765
(1989) (excellent discussion of the history of the development of bad faith). The insurer would, at
most, be held liable for the policy limits for a delay or refusal to settle a claim. Id.
42. JERRY, supra note 15, § 25G, at 120. For example, an insurer may refuse to settle a claim
against the insured by a third party, unless the insured contributes to the settlement. If the insured
refuses to contribute, the insurer may let the claim be litigated. The amount of judgment may
exceed the policy limits. The insured will be liable for this excess judgment and the insurer will be
exposed to little risk. Id.
43. If the cost of the suit against the insurer exceeds the amount of contribution the insurer
demands, the breach by the insurer will go uncompensated. Id. § 25G, at 121.
44. See Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (Ct. App. 1970). See also
Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967). The court stated that imposing liability for
breach of good faith and fair dealing eliminates danger "that the insurer, faced with a settlement
offer. . . will reject it and gamble with the insured's money to further its own interest.' Id. at 177;
Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 553 P.2d 584 (Cal. 1976) (the insurer will gamble with the insured's
money in the hope of securing a judgment on favorable terms rather than to obtain the proposed
settlement).
45. Weldon S. Wood, ComparativeFault As A PartialDefense to Actions For Breach of the
Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 53 INS. COUNs. J. 566, 569 (1986). For
example, an insured may be forced to pay large medical bills because the insurer in bad faith refused
to pay the bills, and the insured may lose his home or business as a result. Id. at 568. See also
Crisci, 426 P.2d at 173 (insured was forced to pay $91,000 when the insurer refused to settle a
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Second, the insurer's absolute discretion to settle a claim has been a
justification for imposing tort liability. 4 The insured's financial well-being
may be put in jeopardy by the insurer's conduct, and the insured may suffer
mental anguish, which is not compensated by contract remedies.4
Theoretically, an insurer with absolute discretion in settling a claim may be able
to extort a substantial contribution to the settlement from the insured.' This
violates the insured's expectations that the insurer would pay all claims that were
within the terms of the policy.49
The insurer's advantageous position is also a factor weighed by courts when
imposing tort liability for breach of the insurance contract.' Insurance policies
are described as contracts of adhesion; 5 thus, the insurer has the superior
bargaining power and the insured has little ability to change the terms of the
policy.52 Insurers are considered to be endowed with the public trust.53 In
order to fully compensate the insureds who are harmed by the insurer's breach

claim).
46. See infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
47. JERRY, supra note 15, § 25G, at 121. Moreover, the plaintiff will not be made whole if
the recovery is limited to economic losses. A portion of a recovery for economic losses must be
used to pay attorney's fees. Tort remedies more fully compensate insureds for all losses. Id.
48. See infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
49. Peter M. Callahan, Some Thoughts on the Avoidance of Extra-contractualDamages in
CaliforniaInsurance Litigaion, 14 W. ST. U.L. REv. 73, 94 (1986).
On the other hand, an argument can be made that the insured who purchases a policy with
minimum limits and then engages in hazardous activities should bear a part of the responsibility for
any conflict of interest, on the part of the insurer, that arises from a claim that exceeds the policy
limits. Id. If the amount of liability insurance was insufficient to the insured's activity, an insured
who faces a claim that is above the policy limits should bear a part of the cost of the claim. Id.
(quoting STEPHEN S. ASHLEY, BAD FAITH AcTIONS-LABILTY AND DAMAGES § 2.12 (1986)).
50. See Milich, supra note 39, at 420.
51. A contract of adhesion is a contract in a standardized form in which the consumer has no
realistic opportunity to bargain as to the terms of the contract. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 38 (5th
ed. 1979).
Insurance contracts are drafted with the aid of skillful and highly paid legal talent, from
which no deviation desired by an applicant will be permitted. The established
underwriter is magnificently qualified to understand and protect its own selfish interests.
In contrast, the applicant is a shorn lamb driven to accept whatever contract may be
offered on a 'take-it-or-leave-it' basis if he wishes insurance protection.
JERRY, supra note 15, § 25C at 104 (quoting 7 SAMUAL WIULSTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTs § 900, at 19-20 (3d ed. 1973)).
52. Karanian, supra note 5, at 313 (the insured is not given the power to change the terms of
the policy).
53. See Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 598 P.2d 452, 457 (Cal. 1979) (court stated that
the insurer provided a public service and therefore was entrusted with the public trust). See also
Karanian, supra note 5, at 313 n.54.
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of the duty of good faith and fair dealing,-' tort principles are used.'
In summary, a court's imposition of tort liability for an insurer's breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing advances two goals. One
goal is to compensate the insured's expectations of coverage under the
insurance policy.' The California courts recognize this special nature of the
insurance policy by imposing tort liability when the insurer breaches the duty of
good faith and fair dealing owed to the insured.' The second objective is to
deter bad faith conduct by insurers on the basis that such conduct is contrary to
social policy.' The goals advanced by the imposition of tort liability are an
attempt to equalize the position of the insured and the insurer.
C. The Application of Bad Faith in California
The California courts have allowed insureds to recover for bad faith against
insurers in both first party and third party claims. The California courts first
applied bad faith for the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing when an insurer failed to settle a third party's claim within the monetary
limits of the insurance policy. In Crisci v. Security Insurance Co.," Mrs.
Crisci, the insured, owned an apartment building in which a third party was
injured. The insurer did not settle with the third party within the limits of the
insurance policy.'
Consequently, the third party sued Mrs. Crisci and
damages were awarded that exceeded the policy limits."' Mrs. Crisci was
required to pay the amount that exceeded the policy limit.'
Mrs. Crisci sued the insurer for a failure to settle the third party claim.
The court held that this breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing was a
54. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
55. Linda Curtis, Note, Damage Measurementsfor Bad Faith Breach of Contract: An Economic
Analysis, 39 STAN. L. REV. 161, 162 (1986) (the author applies an economic analysis to the tort
measurement of damages for bad faith and provides an analytic approach to reform the law of
damages for bad faith).
56. Sandra Chutorian, Note, Tort Remedies for Breach of Contract: The Expansion ofTortious
Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing into the Commercial Realm, 86
COLUM. L. REv. 377, 386, 391 (1986). See supra note 25.
57. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
58. Chutorian, supra note 56, at 391.
59. 426 P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967).
60. Id. at 175-76.
61. Id. at 176.
62. This amount was $91,000. In order to pay this judgment, Mrs. Crisci was forced to sign
an interest in her property to the third party. Mrs. Crisci became indigent and attempted to commit

suicide. Id.
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tort and awarded Mrs. Crisci damages.6 The court reasoned that the standard
to determine whether the insurer had considered the interests of the insured was
whether a prudent insurer without policy limits would have accepted the
settlement offer.' The insurer's failure to accept a reasonable settlement was
the basis of liability for a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
6s
dealing.
In Neal v. Farmers Insurance Exchange,' bad faith was extended to an
action involving only the insured and the insurer. The insured was injured in
an automobile accident and filed a claim with the insurer under the insured's
uninsured motorist coverage.'
The insurer refused to pay the claim.' The
Neal's attorney attempted to settle with Farmers Insurance on several occasions.
Mrs. Neal was injured in 1970, and her attorney was unable to obtain the
amount of her claim under the underinsured motorist policy until 1973.' The
insured subsequently sued the insurer for bad faith and was awarded damages,
including punitive damages.' The court reasoned that based on these facts, an
7
award of extra-contractual damages was appropriate. 1
D. ComparativeBad Faith
The California courts have limited the insured's recovery in a bad faith
claim through comparative bad faith. The duty of good faith and fair dealing
is a "two way street" that extends to both the insured and the insurer.' Both
the insured and the insurer are bound to act reasonably in dealing with each
other.' Sometimes both the insurer and the insured breach this duty of good
faith and fair dealing.74 When the insured breaches the duty of good faith and

63. Id. at 186. Mrs. Crisci was awarded damages for emotional distress. Tort damages were
imposed because the insurer failed to accept a reasonable settlement, not because the insurer
breached the insurance contract. 1 McCARTHY, supra note 6, § 1.8.
64. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 176 (Cal. 1967).
65. Id.
66. 582 P.2d 980 (Cal. 1978).
67. Id. at 983.
68. Id. at 984.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 582 P.2d 980, 986 (Cal. 1978). The court found that Farmers
Insurance had no defense to the insured's claim. Id.

72. Commercial Union Assurance Cos. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 610 P.2d 1038, 1041 (Cal.
1980) ("a duty of good faith and fair dealing in an insurance policy is a two-way street, running
from the insured to his insurer as well as vice versa").
73. Transit Casualty Co. v. Spink Corp., 156 Cal. Rptr. 360 (Ct. App. 1979).
74. For instance, an insured is injured in an automobile accident and sustains injuries. The
injuries are compensable under the uninsured motorist policy the insured had with the insurer. See
California Casualty Gen. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 218 Cal. Rptr. 817 (Ct. App. 1985). See infra
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fair dealing and also sues the insurer for bad faith, the insurer may raise the
affirmative defense of comparative bad faith.
Comparative bad faith is the application of comparative fault principles to
the bad faith insurance context. 5 The insured may breach the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing16 by impeding the insurer's investigation
of the insured's claim or by submitting incomplete information to the insurer.'
Any compensatory damages that would be awarded to the insured for the bad
faith of the insurer will be reduced according to the bad faith conduct of the
insured.' Consequently, any emotional distress or economic loss suffered by
the insured, and caused by the insured's breach will not be fully
compensated.7

Comparative bad faith was officially recognized as an affirmative defense
in California Casualty General Insurance Co. v. Superior Court.'
In
California Casualty, the insured was injured in an automobile accident and
delayed furnishing the insurer with information that the insurer required in order
to pay the claim. The insurer refused to pay the claim, and the insured sued the

notes 80-83 and accompanying text.

However, the insured submits incomplete information

concerning the claim to the insurer. The insurer fails to pay any benefits under the policy to the

insured. In this circumstance, the insured may bring a bad faith action against the insurer, and the
insurer may defend itself by asserting the bad faith conduct of the insured. Id. at 823. See infra
notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
75. The basic principle of comparative negligence is the apportionment of damages between the
parties according to the basis of each party's fault. PROsER, supra note 19, at 575. This was first
applied by the California courts in Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975). In insurance,
the apportionment is based on the bad faith conduct of each of the parties. See infra notes 84-87
and accompanying text.
Comparative bad faith has been described as nothing more than "a refinement of the bad faith
doctrine," that balances the equities between the insurer and the insured. Karanian, supra note 5,
at 322, 325. Equitable principles require that a party should not be responsible for the harm that
the party did not cause. Wood, supra note 45, at 571. The comparative bad faith defense in a bad
faith action promotes this idea of fundamental fairness. Id. at 571. Bad faith was developed to
equalize the relationship between the insurer and the insured. See supra notes 50-55 and
accompanying text. Comparative bad faith may be defined as a retreat from efforts to strengthen
the power of the insured. Karanian, supra note 5, at 323.
76. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text stating that the duty of good faith and fair
dealing extends to both the insured and the insurer.
77. Califomia Casualty, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 822.
78. See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
79. California Casualty Gen. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 218 Cal. Rptr. 817, 822 (Ct. App.
1985) (if the failure of the insured to promptly and accurately furnish the insurer with all the
information pertinent to the claim, and this failure to give all the information delays the insurer's
payment of the claim, any economic loss or emotional distress resulting will be partly caused by the
insured).
80. 218 Cal. Rptr. 817 (Ct. App. 1985).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1992

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 26, No. 3 [1992], Art. 9

854

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26

insurer for a refusal to pay the policy benefits." The court held that there was
no reason why comparative fault principles should not apply to bad faith
cases,82 and allowed the insurer to raise the affirmative defense of comparative
bad faith.'
When an insurer asserts the affirmative defense of comparative bad faith,
the court does not just simply find bad faith conduct by the insured. Previously,
in Fleming v. Safeco Insurance Co. ofAmerica," the California courts reduced
extra-contractual damages based on the bad faith conduct of the insured. In
Fleming, the insured and her attorney delayed in furnishing information to the
insurer concerning the insured's claim." When the insured sued the insurer
for bad faith failure to pay a claim, the insurer claimed that the insured had

81. Id. at 820. After filing its initial answer to the insured's complaint, the insurer moved to
amend its answer to include the defense of the insured's bad faith conduct in presenting the claim.
Id. at 821.
82. Id. at 823 ("we perceive no sound reason, nor is any suggested, why the doctrine of
comparative fault enunciated and applied to negligent conduct.., in Li v. Yellow Cab Co., .. .
should not be applicable to bad faith cases").
83. Id. Comparative bad faith continues to be applied in California. See also Patrick v.
Maryland Casualty Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 24 (Ct. App. 1990) (the insurer was allowed to raise the
comparative bad faith defense when the insured claimed he suffered physical injuries from the
insurer's bad faith handling of a claim for roof damage - the insured attempted to fix the roof
himself).
In addition to comparative bad faith, insurance companies have asserted other defenses against
insureds. See Irwin Waldman & Bruce Warren, Defense of Bad Faith Actions, in BAD FAITH
LITIGATION AND INSURER VS. INSURER DISPUTES 1987, at 127, 136 (PLI Corn. L. & Practice
Course Handbook Series No. 420 (1987)) [hereinafter Waldman & Warren] (short review of
defenses available to insurance companies that are sued by insureds for bad faith). The insurer may
assert a lack of coverage or a good faith error concerning coverage. Kopczynski v. Prudential Ins.
Co. of Am., 211 Cal. Rptr. 12, 14 (Ct. App. 1985) (held an insurer was not liable for bad faith
refusal to pay policy benefits because the insured's claim was not covered under the insurance
policy); Waldman & Warren, supra, at 127. Business justification, industry custom, breach of the
cooperation clause, and the insured's lack of cooperation may also be asserted by the insurer. See
Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (Ct. App. 1970) (an insurer may assert
its legal rights if not asserted in an outrageous manner, but with a good faith belief in the existence
of those rights); Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 521 P.2d 1103 (Cal. 1974) (court was not
persuaded that insurer's delay in payment of insured's medical expenses was customary when the
delay caused the insured to conceal financial information from hospital administrators in order to
undergo needed surgery and caused the insured to suffer two nervous breakdowns); Gruenberg v.
Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973) (the insurer alleged as a defense that the insured had
breached the cooperation clause when the insured failed to submit to an examination under oath);
Othman v. Globe Indem. Co., 759 F.2d 1458 (9th Cir. 1985) (held that under California law if an
insured's failure to cooperate substantially prejudices the insurer's investigation of a claim, the
insurer may deny coverage based on the insured's failure to cooperate); IMcCARTHY, supra note
6, § 1.20-1.23; JERRY, supra note 15, § 85.
84. 206 Cal. Rptr. 313 (Ct. App. 1984).
85. Id.at 316.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol26/iss3/9

1992]

Lass: The Injured Third Party in California: Extending Bad Faith for F

BAD FAITH FOR FULL COMPENSATION

855

Consequently, the compensatory damages that were
acted in bad faith.'
awarded to the insured for the insurer's breach of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing were reduced according to the insured's bad faith."
Thus, an insured whose claim has not been settled by the insurer may sue
the insurer for a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The
insured may recover the amount of proceeds under the insurance policy and
extra-contractual damages. However, other parties may also be injured by the
insurer's refusal to settle a claim. These injured persons are the third parties
who are not parties to the insurance policy between the insured and the insurer.

II. Tim NEED FOR THE THIRD PARTY CLAIM
Although the insured may recover for bad faith, the status of an injured
third party under California law remains unsettled. For example, a third party
who sustains injuries that require medical attention as a result of an automobile
collision with an insured, has a claim against the insured. Although the
insured's liability is clear, if the insurer fails to settle the third party's claim, the
third party will be unable to receive compensation for his injuries.
The insurer's refusal to settle the third party's claim may cause the third
party considerable economic loss. If the third party's injuries were severe, the
third party may be unable to work and may suffer a loss of income.' The loss
of income, in turn, may drive the third party into debt due to his inability to pay
his medical bills and support his family. As a result, the third party may also
suffer mental anguish."s
Despite the fact that an insured can sue his insurer for a breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,' a third party injured by the
insured may have difficulty recovering for injuries if the insurer refuses to settle
with the third party.9 The third party may not be able to sue the insurer on
a common law bad faith cause of action because privity is lacking between the

86. Id.
87. Id. Comparative bad faith was not officially recognized in Fleming because the parties had
stipulated to each party's respective comparative fault. BAD FArrIH, supra note 15, § 10:48.

88. Allan E. Ceran, Comment, Extending the Insured'sDuty of Good Faith and FairDealing
to Third Parties Under Liability Insurance Policies, 25 UCLA L. Rev. 1413, 1424 (1978).

89. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
90. See supra notes 20-27 and accompanying text.
91. Insurance disputes involving third parties focus on the insurer's failure to settle the third
party's claim, and the insurer's duty to defend the insured when a third party sues the insured.
Komblum, supra note 14, at 50. The duty to defend extends only to the insured. Id. at 51. This
Note considers only the third party's cause of action against the insurer for a bad faith failure to
settle. See generallyId.
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insurer and the third party.' Since the third party is not a party to the contract
with the insurer, privity is not present between the third party and the
insurer." For a brief time,' the third party could sue the insurer under a
statutory cause of action.9s
Other existing remedies that may be used by the third party are inadequate
and do not fully compensate the third party." Since the statutory cause of
action has been foreclosed, at least one California appellate court has allowed
the third party to directly sue the insurer.'
However, other California
appellate courts have held that a third party has no standing to sue the
insurer."
If the third party is not allowed to sue the insurer for failure to settle the
claim, the insurer will not be deterred from refusing to settle third party
claims.' The third party will not be able to recover for damages stemming
from the insurer's refusal to settle, such as damages for mental anguish."W
The third party must be allowed to sue the insurer to ensure that the third
party's injuries are compensated through a cause of action for bad faith. This
section will discuss the inadequacies of existing remedies available to the third
party when faced with an uncooperative insurer 1 and propose model
legislation to reinstate a direct cause of action to be asserted against the
insurer."° But in extending this right to third parties, a correlative concern
arises regarding potentially unlimited liability for insurers. Thus, a limitation
on direct third party suits is necessary to protect the insurer from unlimited
liability and to establish, within third party suits, the balance that exists in first

92. Without privity, the suit for bad faith does not exist. Consequently, if no cause of action
for bad faith is allowed, tort liability will not be allowed for a breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing for failure to settle a third party's claim. BAD FAITH, supra note 15, § 1: 11. An
insured is able to sue the insurer for a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing because this
duty runs with the insurance contract that is between the insured and the insurer. See supra notes
6-10 and accompanying text.
93. BAD FAITH, supranote 15, § 1:11. The duty of good faith and fair dealing is intended to
protect only the insured. Id.
94. A private third party cause of action existed for eleven years. See infra notes 126-32.
95. See infra notes 126-31 and accompanying text.
96. See infra notes 104-25 and accompanying text.
97. See infra notes 157-65 and accompanying text.
98. See infra note 156, 166 and accompanying text.
99. Ceran, supra note 88, at 1425. See supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
100. Ceran, supra note 88, at 1425. If the injured party had been the insured, and the insurer
did not pay the claim in bad faith, the insured would be able to sue the insurer and receive
compensation. See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
101. See infra notes 104-25 and accompanying text.
102. See infra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
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party suits where the insurer raises the defense of comparative bad faith.1"
A. Existing Remedies For the Injured Third Party
Although privity is absent between the third party and the insurer, the third
party has several alternative remedies to obtain damages when the insurer
refuses to settle. These remedies include assignment, filing a complaint with the
insurance commissioner, filing a complaint against the insured, and attempting
to file a tort suit against the insurer. None of these remedies, however, will fully

compensate the injured third party.
The third party can sue the insurer for failure to settle a claim based on an
assignment from the insured," 4 but the third party's recovery under an
assignment is limited. A third party who sues the insurer based on an
assignment from the insured will not be able to recover the whole amount of bad
faith damages that the insured would be able to recover."' 5 An insured would
recover all damages for bad faith, even if this amount exceeded the monetary
limits of the insurance policy."°
An insured may recover damages for

103. See supra notes 72-87 and accompanying text. See also infra note 174. This Note
proposes that a comparative bad faith defense to be asserted against a third party be a component
to a third party statutory cause of action.
104. The insured may assign his right to sue the insurer to the injured third party. I
MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 2.59. In California, an insured may assign his right to sue the insurer
for failure to settle a third party claim to the third party. Kornblum, supra note 14, at 50. An
insured will usually assign his rights against the insurer to the third party when the insured's rights
have been violated by the insurer, and the insurer fails to settle the third party's claim. The insured
assigns his right in exchange for a covenant from the third party not to use the insured's personal
assets to satisfy a judgment. Ray Bourhis, Practical Concernsfor Civil Litigators in Light of
Moradi-Shalal, 18 F.: OFFICLAL PUBuC. CAL. TRIAL LAW. ASS'N 365, 367 (1988).
A third party or insured who attempts to recover against the insurer on a theory
of a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing must plead and prove
the following elements:
1. That the carrier received timely notice of the insured's claim and had a reasonable
opportunity to settle within policy limits;
2. That the insurer unreasonably rejected or refused a settlement offer within the policy
limits;
3. That an excess judgment was returned against the insured and that the judgment is
final (or that the underlying case has been otherwise concluded); and
4. For an action by a third party, that the excess judgment against the insured was
assigned to the third party.
Komblum, supra note 14, at 50.
105. BAD FAITH, supra note 15, § 1:11.
106. Kornblum, supra note 14, at 50. The insurer is liable to the insured for all damages
proximately resulting from the insurer's wrongful conduct, whether the damage was anticipated or
not. Id.The insurer may be liable for compensatory damages, including emotional distress, mental
suffering, and punitive damages. Id.
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emotional distress, mental suffering, and punitive damages.'" By contrast,
the third party who sues under an assignment will not receive the full damage
amount that an insured would receive. The third party will only recover the
amount of the judgment that exceeds the monetary limits of the policy. e'
Other problems arise when an insured assigns a cause of action to the third
party. First, general and punitive damages cannot be assigned." Personal

injury claims and emotional distress claims are also not assignable to the third
party." 0

Consequently, the third party's damage recovery is extremely

limited.
Although the insured's tort cause of action is not assignable to the third

party, the third party may attempt to bring his own tort suit against the insurer.
The third party could attempt to sue the insurer for intentional infliction of
emotional distress."' Damages for emotional distress will not be awarded to
the third party unless the third party can show outrageous conduct by the
insurer. " 2 Consequently, the third party will not be awarded damages if the
insurer simply delayed or refused to settle with the third party." 3 In most
suits, the third party will not be able to meet this standard of conduct because
most collateral injuries will be financial. 4 The third party will also not be
able to sue the insurer for fraud or libel."'
The third party might also choose to sue the insured. The insured would
then sue the insurer for failure to settle with the third party, asking for
indemnification. This method creates needless litigation and does not guarantee

107. Id.
108. Id. Consequently, if the judgment from the assigned cause of action is less than the policy
limits, the third party will receive nothing.
109. Bourhis, supra note 104, at 367; see also Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 553 P.2d 584 (Cal.
1976).
110. BAD FAITH, supra note 15, § 1:11. See supra note 41, at 790. Assigning a claim to the
third party has dangers for the insured. An insured must be careful to not extinguish any of the
insured's rights by "improperly splitting a cause of action." Id. An assignment that is not carefully
worded may not preserve the insured's right to general and punitive damages. Id.
111. Ceran, supra note 88, at 1436; Gainer, supra note 41, at 790-91.
112. Ceran, supra note 88, at 1436.
113. Ceran, supra note 88, at 1436-37 & 1437 n.102 (citing Little v. Stuvesant Life Ins. Co.,
136 Cal. Rptr. 653 (Ct. App. 1977) (where a court awarded damages for outrageous behavior in
refusal to settle)).
114. Ceran, supra note 88, at 1437.
115. Id. at 1435 nn.97, 98. Fraud cannot be sued upon because the third party was not a patty
to the insurance contract and cannot claim misrepresentation. Wetherbee v. United Ins. Co. of Am.,
71 Cal. Rptr. 764 (Ct. App. 1968). A third party may only sue for defamation if the insurer has
made statements about the third party that injure the reputation of the third party. Ceran, supra note
88, at 1435 n.98. An insurer will rather delay in settlement then risk defamation. Thus, defamation
will rarely protect a third party who has suffered economic loss. Id.
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that the third party will receive damages." 6 An assignment is a more suitable
alternative for the third party.
If the insured does not assign a bad faith cause of action to the third party,
the third party may file a complaint with the Insurance Commissioner." 7
Upon finding that the insurer acted deceptively, the Insurance Commissioner
shall issue a cease and desist order."' The insurer will be fined for violations
of a cease and desist order." 9 The Insurance Commissioner does not have the
power to order the insurer to pay damages to the third party. m Not only does
filing a complaint with the Insurance Commissioner not provide damages to the
third party, but this method has been criticized as lacking effectiveness to protect
2
consumers against insurer practices.' '
Courts have relied on the third party beneficiary theory to obtain relief for
the third party.'
This theory states that the parties to a liability insurance
contract intend that the amount of funds available under the policy will be paid

116. Although the third party may obtain a judgment against the insured, the insured may be
unable to pay the judgment. The insured may then be forced to sue the insurer in order to pay the
judgment obtained by the third party. Diana C. White, Comment, Liability Insurersand 7Tird-party
Claimants: 7he Limits of Duty, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 125, 128 (1981). This will create considerable
delay in compensating the third party in addition to forcing needless litigation. Id. Furthermore,
the insured may declare bankruptcy and any unpaid debts, which could include the judgment, will
be discharged. Id. at 136 & nn.41-44.
117. The Insurance Commissioner is empowered to investigate practices of insurance companies
and assess penalties for violations of the insurance code. CAL. INS. CODE § 790.04 (West 1987).
118. CAL. INs. CODE § 790.05 (West 1987 & Supp. 1991).
Whenever the commissioner shall have reason to believe that.., such person has been
engaged or is engaging in... any unfair competition or any unfair or deceptive act or
practice . . . the commissioner should issue an order to that person to . . . cease and
desist those methods, acts, or practices or any of them.
Id.
119. CAL. INs. CODE § 790.07 (West 1987 & Supp. 1991).
Whenever the commissioner shall have reason to believe that any person has
violated a cease and desist order issued pursuant to Section 790.05 . . . the
commissioner may ... order that person to forfeit and pay to the State of California a
sum not to exceed five thousand dollars ... if the violation is found to be wilfuil, the
amount of the penalty may be a sum not to exceed fifty-five thousand dollars plus the
penalty due under Section 790.05.
Id.
The fines imposed by the Insurance Commissioner are paid to the state and not to the third
party. See also Elise Suzanne Rose, Comment, A Statutory Action For Insurer Bad Faith-The
Reasonably Clear Remedy For 7he 7hird Party Claimant, 11 PAC. L.J. 945, 948 (1980).
120. See supra notes 118-19.
121. Tom Dresslar, Bill would Overturn Moradi-Shalal, L.A. DAILY J., Jan. 27, 1989, at 3,
col. 2.
122. This is a theory that has been relied upon by courts other than in California. White, supra
note 116, at 141 n.57.
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to persons injured by the insured.Iu However, an inference that the third
party was to be a beneficiary beyond the policy limits is difficult to extract from
the policy language." Public policy dictates that the third party beneficiary
theory would change the rights and duties of the insurer and the insured, along
with changing the nature of the insurance policy.12
Consequently, the available avenues for a third party to recover damages
when an insurer refuses to settle with the third party are extremely limited.
Either the third party will be undercompensated or not compensated at all.
Since third parties suffer substantial injuries and losses that are not adequately

compensated, a uniform method of recovery must be developed to fully
compensate third parties.
B. A Statutory Cause of Action
The Unfair Practices Act has been the subject of a third party private cause
of action in California. For eleven years the Unfair Practices Act was
interpreted to support a cause of action for third parties to directly sue insurers.
The controversy surrounding the third party cause of action can be attributed to
123. Professor Corbin states the third party beneficiary theory as follows:
[Liability and indemnity insurance] policies may be worded as to make it clear that they
are intended solely for the protection and indemnity of the insured. Indeed, the promise
may be merely to reimburse the insured in case he is compelled to pay damages to some
third party. If the contract is clearly for the sole benefit of the promisee, being merely
for his indemnification or reimbursement, no third party has an enforceable right by
virtue of the policy. There is a tendency, however, for the states to require by
legislation the carrying of liability insurance for the protection of third parties. Policies
that are issued by virtue of such legislation should be interpreted as being for the benefit
of the third party and should be held to give him an enforceable right against the
insurer. Even in the absence of such legislation the injured third party should have an
enforceable right against the insurer if the policy is so worded as to indicate that it was
executed for the protection of third persons, or as to amount to a promise to pay the
debt of the insured to the injured party.
White, supra note 116, at 140 n.56 (citing 4 ARTHUR CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 807, at
213-16 (footnotes omitted)).
124. White, supra note 116, at 142. Three arguments support the theory that the third party
was not meant to be a beneficiary. First, even though the insured may sue the insurer for a
wrongful failure to settle as a breach of the fiduciary duty to the insured, and not to the adverse
party, the insured intended for the third party to assert a claim against the insurer. Id. Second, the
insurer's wrongful failure to settle negates part of the policy language. "It is as if a new policy
came into existence at the moment of the breach, and the only limitation on the amount of the new
policy were the insured's legal obligation to pay." Id. The third party then becomes only an
incidental beneficiary. Id. Third, the third party may be seen as the direct beneficiary of the
insurance policy. Thus, once the third party is identified, the insurer and the insured intended for
the third party to "take advantage of more of the contract's covenants than the promise to pay within
policy limits." Id. at 193. This interpretation makes nonsense out of the insurance policy. Id.
125. Id. at 144.
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the language of the statute and the legislative history of the Unfair Practices Act.
The California Supreme Court allowed a third party to directly sue an
insurer under a statute in Royal Globe Insurance Co. v. Superior Court." In
Royal Globe, the third party was injured in the insured's supermarket. The
supermarket's liability was clear, but Royal Globe, the supermarket's insurer,
failed to settle the third party's claim. The third party sued Royal Globe under
section 790.03 of the California Unfair Practices Act" alleging that Royal

126. 592 P.2d 329 (Cal. 1979).
127. The relevant section of 790.03 provides:
[t]he following are hereby defined as unfair methods of competition and unfair and
deceptive acts or practices in the business of insurance.....

(h) Knowingly committing or performing with such frequency as to indicate a general
business practice any of the following unfair claims settlement practices:
(1) Misrepresenting to claimants pertinent facts or insurance policy provisions relating
to any coverages at issue.
(2) Failing to acknowledge and act reasonably promptly upon communications with
respect to claims arising under insurance policies.
(3) Failing to adopt and implement reasonable standards for the prompt investigation
and processing of claims arising under insurance policies.
(4) Failing to affirm or deny coverage of claims within a reasonable time after proof
of loss requirements have been completed and submitted by the Insured.
(5) Not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and equitable settlements
of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear.
(6) Compelling insureds to institute litigation to recover amounts due under an
insurance policy by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately recovered in
actions brought by the insureds, when the insureds have made claims for amounts
reasonably similar to the amounts ultimately recovered.
(7) Attempting to settle a claim by an Insured for less than the amount to which a
reasonable man would have believed he was entitled by reference to written or printed
advertising material accompanying or made part of an application.
(8) Attempting to settle claims on the basis of an application which was altered
without notice to, or knowledge or consent of, the insured, his or her representative,
agent, or broker.
(9) Failing, after payment of a claim, to inform insureds or beneficiaries, upon
request by them, of the coverage under which payment has been made.
(10) Making known to insuredsor claimantsa practice of the insurer of appealing from
arbitration awards in favor of insuredsor claimants for the purpose of compelling them
to accept settlements or compromises less than the amount awarded in arbitration.
(11) Delaying the investigation or payment of claims by requiring an insured, claimant,
or the physician of either, to submit a preliminary claim report, and then requiring the
subsequent submission of formal proof of loss forms, both of which submissions contain
substantially the same information.
(12) Failing to settle claims promptly, where liability has become apparent, under one
portion of the insurance policy coverage in order to influence settlements under other
portions of the insurance policy coverage.
(13) Failing to provide promptly a reasonable explanation of the basis relied on in the
insurance policy, in relation to the facts or applicable law, for the denial of a claim or
for the offer of a compromise settlement.
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Globe failed to settle the claim in good faith."n
Royal Globe claimed that the statute did not allow third parties to bring a
private cause of action, but that the statute was to be enforced by the Insurance
Commissioner through a cease and desist order."9 The court held that a cease
and desist order issued by the Insurance Commissioner under the Unfair
Practices Act does not release the insurer from civil liability." Consequently,
private litigants, including third parties, would be allowed to sue the insurer for
unfair practices under the Unfair Practices Act. 3'
However, in Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Cos., 132 the
California Supreme Court overruled Royal Globe and held that a third party
could not bring a private cause of action under the Unfair Practices Act. In
Moradi-Shalal,the insured and the third party were driving automobiles when
the insured's car hit the third party's car. The insurer did not settle the third
party's claim for damages. Consequently, the third party sued the insurer under
the Unfair Practices Act for failure to settle the claim.' 33
The California Supreme Court denied the third party's claim and stated
several reasons for overruling Royal Globe. The court first looked to other
jurisdictions' reactions to the Royal Globe decision. The court noted that several

(14) Directly advising a claimant not to obtain the services of an attorney.
(15) Misleading a claimant as to the applicable statute of limitations.
CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03 (West 1987 & Supp. 1991) (emphasis added). The Unfair Practices Act
regulates the business and affairs of insurance companiesdoing business in California. Forexample,
the Act regulates advertising, unfair methods of competition, rates, etc. BAD FAITH, supra note 15,
§ 9:2. The legislature amended section 790.03 to include subsection (h). Rose, supra note 119, at
948. See generally Wylie A. Aitken & James B. Abeltin, When Does "The Fat Lady Sing"for
Purposes of a Royal Globe Action? Endless Litigation over What Does or Should Constitute the
Resolution of a Claim, 14 W. ST. U.L. REv. 55, 56 (1986) (brief history of the California Unfair
Practices Act).
128. Royal Globe, 592 P.2d at 332.
129. Id. Royal Globe contended that the Insurance Commissioner had exclusive power to
enforce section 790.03(h) of the Insurance Code, that the code was only meant to protect the
insured, and that third parties lacked standing to bring a cause of action under the code. Id.
130. Id. at 334. CAL. INS. CODE § 790.09 (West 1987).
No order to cease and desist issued under this article directed to any person or
subsequent administrative or judicial proceeding to enforce the same shall in any way
relieve or absolve such person from any administrative action against the license or
certificate of such person, civil liability or criminal penalty under the laws of this State
arising out of the methods, acts or practices found unfair or deceptive.
Id. (emphasis added).
131. Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 592 P.2d 329, 333 (Cal. 1979).
132. 758 P.2d 58 (Cal. 1988).
133. Id. at 63. The third party alleged that the insurer did not promptly investigate or attempt
in good faith to effectuate a prompt settlement of the claim. See supra note 127.
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states with Unfair Practices Acts had not construed the statutes as creating a
private cause of action for third parties."
The court also considered the
legislative response to Royal Globe. The court construed both the legislature's
failure to explicitly codify Royal Globe and the California Senate's one attempt
to overrule Royal Globe as an indication that Royal Globe should be overruled
because it was inconsistent with the legislative intent of the statute. 35
Furthermore, the court gave considerable weight to the scholarly criticisms of
the Royal Globe decision in making its decision to overrule Royal Globe."
The court justified overruling Royal Globe by citing to the remedies that
were still available against insurers. Although the Insurance Commissioner
would still be able to impose administrative sanctions against insurers, such as
cease and desist orders, fines, and suspensions of insurers' licenses, 37 the
court stated that the California courts could still award damages against the
insurers in appropriate common law actions." The court further stated that
the legislature was free to create new civil remedies or to create a private cause

134. Moradi-Shalal, 758 P.2d at 63. Many states have enacted Unfair Practice Statutes.
MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 2.24. Thirteen states allow a third party to bring a private cause of
action under an unfair practices statute. Moradi-Shalal,758 P.2d at 63. The California Supreme
Court stated that nineteen other states had dealt with whether a private cause of action had been
created for third parties under the Unfair Practices Act. Id. Seventeen of these courts did not
recognize a private cause of action for third parties. Id. However, eight states have acknowledged
the Royal-Globe decision, but have not followed it. Id. Nine states have rejected the Royal-Globe
holding. Id. The Moradi-Shalalcourt cited with approval to a decision by the Minnesota Supreme
court holding that the Minnesota Unfair Practices Act did not create a private third party cause of
action because the Act provided for administrative regulations of insurance practices and did not
mention a private cause of action. Id. at 64 (citing Morris v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co, 386
N.W.2d 233 (Minn. 1986)).
135. Moradi-Shalal, 758 P.2d at 65. In May 1979, the California Senate introduced a bill that
provided that section 790.03(h) of the Insurance code did not impose civil liability upon insurance
companies found in violation of the insurance code. Id. at 65. This bill became "stalled" in the
California legislature's Ways and Means Committee and was never considered by the whole
legislature. Id. At most, the short history of this bill can be construed that the legislature was far
from agreement on the existence of a private third party cause of action under section 790.03(h).
The court concluded that even though this legislative history was inconclusive, it still casts doubt
on the reasoning in Royal Globe. Id. at 66. Compare notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
136. Moradi-Shalal, 758 P.2d at 64-65. The court cited several law review articles that
criticized the Royal Globe decision. The court also stated that the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners Model Unfair Claims Practices Act did not create an individual private cause of
action. Id.
137. Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., 758 P.2d 58, 68 (Cal. 1988).
138. Id. at 68-69. The court stated that damages could be imposed on insurance companies in
common law actions that were based on traditional theories, such as fraud, emotional distress, and
the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (a cause of action for the breach
of the implied covenant would be available only to the insured). Id. This list of common law
remedies may be construed to mean that a third party may be allowed to sue under a common law
theory that does not involve the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
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of action under the Unfair Practices Act. 39 After Moradi-Shalal, third parties
were returned to the pre-Royal Globe status of inadequate remedies. '"
The dissent in Moradi-Shalalrefuted the majority's reasoning and called the
reversal of Royal Globe a "Royal Bonanza."' 4 ' The dissent objected to the
majority opinion for several reasons. The dissent objected to the emphasis that
the majority placed on legislative inaction, the efficacy of disciplinary
proceedings instituted by the Insurance Commissioner, and the majority's
rejection of prior case law in interpreting the Unfair Practices Act.
The dissent particularly disagreed with the majority's interpretation of the
legislative action subsequent to the Royal Globe decision. The dissent
emphasized that since Royal Globe, the California Legislature had failed to pass
legislation specifically overruling Royal Globe."2 In 1983, the Legislature
actually amended section 790.03, but did not change subsection (h)."4 3 The
dissent argued that legislative inaction was thus an indication of legislative intent
to leave the law as it stood.'" In 1979, the insurance industry unsuccessfully
attempted to persuade the legislature to overrule Royal Globe.t"
The dissent also considered the failure of the Insurance Commissioner to
commence disciplinary proceedings against insurers for deceptive and unfair acts
involving claimants such as third parties. 4 Since 1959, when section 790 of
the Insurance Code was enacted, not one case had been reported in the
California Reports or the California Appellate Reports involving disciplinary
action against insurers.' 47 Although the majority stated that after MoradiShalal the Insurance Commissioner will continue to "police" insurers, such
"policing" seems unlikely."' A third party's remedy against the insurer is
therefore very limited after Moradi-Shalal.49

139. Id. at 69.
140. Gainer, supra note 41, at 790.
141. Moradi-Shalal,758 P.2d at 75. Judge Mosk, the dissenter, stated that the overruling of
Royal Globe creates "total immunity for unfair and deceptive practices committed on innocent
claimants." Id.
142. Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., 758 P.2d 58, 77-78 (Cal. 1988).
143. Id. at 78.
144. Id. The dissent stated that the legislature's refusal to pass a bill that would expressly
overrule Royal Globe was not legislative silence, but approval of the Royal Globe decision. Id.
145. Id. at 77. This Senate bill would have amended section 790.03 of the Unfair Practices Act
to specifically deny private causes of action for third parties. Id. This bill was rejected by the Ways
and Means Committee and eventually died. Id. at 78.
146. Moradi-Shalal,758 P.2d at 77.
147. Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., 758 P.2d 58, 77 (Cal. 1988).
148. See supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 104-25 and accompanying text.
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The dissent also construed case law prior to Royal Globe as an indication
that the Unfair Practices Act allowed a third party cause of action. In support
of third party causes of action, the dissent discussed three cases that stated that
the Unfair Practices Act contemplated private liability for insurers in addition
to sanctions by the Insurance Commissioner." s
Since the decision in Moradi-Shalalclosed the door on third party causes
of action, subsequent attempts have been made by the legislature to force this
door back open) 5' In 1988, the California voters were asked to vote on
Proposition 103, which regulated insurance practices." s Proposition 103 was
designed to "regulate insurance companies, give good driver discounts, and end
anti-trust exemptions."' 53 Proposition 103 also contained a provision that
allowed "any person" to enforce Proposition 103." s The voters approved
Proposition 103 and the legislature subsequently codified it. 5' However, the
California courts have construed Proposition 103 as not creating a private
statutory cause of action for third parties to sue insurers." Attempts by the
people of California to reinstate the third party cause of action have been futile.

150. Moradi-Shalal,758 P.2d at 78-79 (citing Homestead Supplies, Inc. v. Executive Life Ins.
Co., 147 Cal. Rptr. 22 (Ct. App. 1978) (the nature of the conduct proscribed in § 790.03 is to
protect the public; thus § 790.03 contemplates civil liability to the public); Shernoffv. Superior
Court, 118 Cal. Rptr. 680 (Ct. App. 1975) (the Insurance Commissioner's sanctions restrain future
illegal conduct and do not enter money judgments to the third party for past injuries); Greenberg v.
Equitable Life Assurance Society, 110 Cal. Rptr. 470 (Ct. App. 1973) (the insurance code
contemplates private causes of action against insurance companies and any other reading of the
insurance code would overturn Crisci by implication)).
151. See generally Tom Dressier, Bill Would Overturn Moradi-Shalal, L.A. DAILY J.,Mar.
27, 1989, at 3, col. 2 (remarks concerning a bill that was to reverse the effects of Moradi-Shalal).
Rick Kushman, The Insurance-reform Stampede, 19 CAL. J. 417 (1988) (discussing five proposals
concerning automobile insurance that were put before the California voters in 1988).
152. BAD FATH, supra note 15, § 9:171. Proposition 103 was mainly aimed at insurance rate
regulation. Id.
153. Kushman, supra note 151, at 419.
154. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.10(a) (West Supp. 1991).

Any person may initiate or intervene in any proceeding permitted or established pursuant
to this chapter, challenge any action of the commissioner under this article, and enforce
any provision of this article.
155. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861-1861.16 (West Supp. 1991).
Proposition 103 was titled a "Prohibition on Unfair Insurance Practices." Section 1861.03(a)
concerns unfair insurance practices.
The business of insurance shall be subject to the laws of California applicable to any
other business, including, but not limited to, the Unruh Civil Rights Act . . . the
antitrust and unfair business practices laws (Parts 2 (commencing with Section 16600)
and 3 (commencing with Section 17500) of Division 7 of the Business and Professions
Code).
CAL. INS. CODE 1861.03(a) (West Supp. 1991).
156. Maler v. Superior Court, 270 Cal. Rptr. 222 (Ct. App. 1990) (Proposition 103 does not
create a private of action for third parties to directly sue insurers using § 790.03).
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Although courts have construed Proposition 103 and the Unfair Practices
Act to preclude a third party cause of action, a third party successfully sued an

insurer under the Unfair Competition Statute' 57 in Beatty v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. 'm In Beatty, a third party was injured when an

automobile driven by the insured hit the third party's automobile.

59

The

insurer refused to pay the claim, and the third party sued the insurer. The third

party alleged that the insurer's refusal to pay the third party's claim was an
1
unfair business practice under the Unfair Competition Statute.'W

The court allowed the third party to recover damages based on this statutory

cause of action and held that the Unfair Competition Statute had a broad
function to protect consumers.'
The court held that limiting statutes other
than the Unfair Practices Act under Moradi-Shalal'" would be inconsistent

with this broad protective function." The Beatty court considered the list of
remedies that the court in Moradi-Shalal stated were still available.',
However, the Beatty court considered the remedies to be illustrative, not
exhaustive, and added a suit under the Unfair Competition Statute to this
list. sa
Since Beatty, several courts have decided cases in which a third party

157. The Unfair Competition Statute protects consumers (as well as competitors) from unfair
business practices. Unfair business practices constitute business practices that are forbidden by law.
BAD FAITH, supra note 15, § 9:179.
"As used in this chapter, unfair competition shall mean and include unlawful, unfair or
fraudulent business practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising and any act
prohibited by Chapter I (commencing with section 17500) of Part 3 of Division 7 of the Business
and Professions Code."
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 1987).
Although Proposition 103 was not used in Beaty, Proposition 103 specifically makes applicable the
unfair business practice laws of the Business and Professions Code. BAD FAITH, supra note 15, §
9:176.
158. 262 Cal. Rptr. 79 (Ct. App. 1989). The California Supreme Court denied review and
ordered the opinion to be officially unpublished. But the opinion was inadvertently published and
subsequently cited as authority in Marenger v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 268 Cal. Rptr. 290
(Ct. App. 1990). Commentators have also discussed the Beatty decision. See, e.g., Kent D.
Syvenid, The Duty to Settle, 76 VA. L. REV. 1113, 1121 n.16 (1991); Archie S. Robinson, The
Statutory Bad Faith Hydra Grows Another Head in California, 31 FOR Del. 21 (1989); 1
MCCARTHY, supra note 6, at § 2.23.
159. Beatty, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
160. Id. at 81. See supra note 157.
161. Beatty, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 86. This broad protective function meant that an insurer's
practice only had to be unfair and not necessarily unlawful to violate the unfair competition act. Id.
162. Moradi-Shalalspecifically limited the enforcement of the Unfair Practices Statute to the
insurance commissioner. See supra note 138.
163. Beatty v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 262 Cal. Rptr. 79, 86 (Ct. App. 1989).
164. Id. at 86. See supra notes 138-40.
165. Beatty, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 86.
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sued an insurer on a private cause of action. Among these cases, Beatty appears
to be the exception. These courts have held that no private cause of action for
third parties is available under the Unfair Competition Statute.'"
Thus, existing remedies for the injured third party are few and inadequate.
The best remedy available to the third party is a private cause of action based
on a statute because it provides certain advantages. 'I A statutory cause of
action eliminates the problems associated with privity that prevent the third party
from suing the insurer for a breach of covenant of good faith and fair

dealing. '

Furthermore, a statutory cause of action enables the third party to

recover damages and be fully compensated."
C. Proposed Third Party Cause of Action
The absence of a firmly established statutory cause of action in California
may be explained by a lack of communication between the California legislature
and the California courts."
Although the legislature has attempted to
overrule Moradi-Shalal, the courts are unwilling to follow the legislature and
create an implied third party cause of action. Because the courts are unwilling
to develop a cause of action that will fully compensate the third party, a statute
should be enacted that clearly and explicitly creates a third party cause of action

166. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Superior Court, 265 Cal. Rptr. 585 (Ct. App. 1990) (a different
California appellate court held that the Unfair Competition Statute did not create a private third party
cause of action); Industrial Indem. Co. v. Santa Cruz County Superior Court, 257 Cal. Rptr. 655
(Ct. App. 1989) (private litigants do not have a cause of action for damages under the Business &
Professions Code).
Several concerns have been raised pertaining to Beany. See Robinson, supra note 158. One
troubling aspect of Beaty is what an unfair business practice is under the Business and Professions
Code. Id. at 24. The Unfair Competition Statute lists insurance practices that are unfair. Id. The
Business and Professions Code does not describe what an unfair practice involves, but unfair at least
means tortious. Id. This definition of "unfair" renders the Business and Professions Code needless
because a 'tortious practice and otherwise unlawful practice" have independent remedies. Id.
167. This private statutory cause of action should be similar to the third party suit in Royal
Globe.
168. Privity prevents the third party from directly suing the insurer for a breach of the duty of
good faith and fair dealing.
169. See supra notes 20-27 and accompanying text.
170. For example, both the majority and the dissent in Moradi-Shalalinterpreted differently
the actions of the legislature following Royal Globe. The dissent also considered cases where the
appellate courts construed the Unfair Practices Act as allowing a third party cause of action. See
supra note 150. Yet the California Supreme Court decided that the cause of action did not exist.
See supra notes 134-40 and accompanying text. The legislature may have thought that the cause of
action already existed. See supra note 144. See also supra note 166 and accompanying text
discussing that at least one appellate court has allowed a third party cause of action and another
appellate court has rejected the cause of action,

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1992

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 26, No. 3 [1992], Art. 9

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

868

[Vol. 26

that would allow a third party to fully recover. 171
In order to provide third parties with a procedure for recovering fully for
their losses, the following addition to Section 790.03 of the Unfair Practices Act
should be made:
(i)
(j)
(k)

(1)

(m)

A claimant is any person, either an insured or a third party, who
has been subject to unfair practices by an insurer.
Unfair practices are conduct by an insurer as defined in
subsection (h) of this section (790.03).
A claimant or an insured may enforce this Act
(i) by directly bringing a suit against the insurer under
subsection (h) of this Act, or
(ii) through the Insurance Commissioner under section 790.05 of
this Act.
An insurer who is found liable for unfair practices may raise the
conduct of the claimant as a defense, if the claimant
(i) fails to promptly and adequately furnish the insurer with all
pertinent information and evidence, and
(ii) the claimant's failure to furnish information and evidence
delays or impedes the insurance carrier's investigation and
payment of the claim."
(iii) Any conduct of the claimant defined by (i) and (ii) of this
subsection will reduce the claimant's damages comparatively
with the claimant's conduct.
Any conduct by a claimant that conforms to conduct defined in
subsection (1) may be considered if the claimant's conduct is not
raised by the insurer.

This proposed amendment will treat the third party and the insured as
equals. The third party will be able to directly sue an insurer for failing to
reasonably settle a third party claim. The third party will be able to recover for
emotional distress and other loss proximately caused by the insurer's bad faith
conduct.'73

171. At least one author predicted that the California Supreme Court may hold that the Business
and Professions Code does not support a private third party cause of action. BAD FArrH, supra note
15, § 9:198. Thus, the legislature should solidify a private cause of action for third parties before
the California Supreme Court totally precludes the statutory cause of action.
172. This is in essence the language from Califomia Casualtycreating the comparative bad faith
defense against first parties. California Casualty Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 218 Cal. Rptr. 817,
(Ct. App. 1985).
173. See generally Koniblum, supra note 14; see also supra notes 22-27 and accompanying
text.
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However, this statute also protects the insurer from unlimited liability by
limiting the amount of damages that could be recovered by the third party. 7 '
This limitation is in response to a concern about an increase in both litigation
The judicial development of
and damage awards against the insurer.'
comparative bad faith has created a balance between the insurer and the
insured.'" Although third parties must be allowed to recover damages against
the insurer, third parties should not be given a windfall through a statutory third
party suit.'" Consequently, a comparative bad faith defense for the insurer
creates a balance between the third party and the insurer, similar to the one that

174. The third party's delay or incomplete settlement offer may be contributed to the insurer's
failure to settle the claim. If a third party is able to sue the insurer, then the insurer should be able
to assert a comparative bad faith type defense. Although comparative bad faith was first applied
between the insured and the insurer, comparative bad faith can be, and should be, extended between
the insurer and the third party. DONALD T. McMILLAN & LEONARD J. PUGATCH, BAD FAITH
LITIGATION: DEFENSE VIEWPOINT-TAcrICS AND STRATEGY, reprintedin BAD FAITH LTmoATION
AND INSURER VS. INSURER DisPUTEs 1988, at 83, 90 (PLI Com. L. & Practice Course Handbook
Series No. 455 (1988)) (stating that a comparative bad faith defense should exist in third party
statutory actions, but not discussing any basis or framework for such a defense). The situation
between an injured third party and an insurer is sufficiently similar to the situation between the
insured and the insurer to warrant the extension of comparative bad faith. Ceran, supra note 88,
at 1424 (considering the similarities between the insured and the injured third party: both parties
are injured, both must deal directly with the insurer, and both may incur further injury if the insurer
fails to settle). See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text. The underlying policies of
comparative bad faith apply to the third party's conduct when the third party sues the insurer. See
supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text. Consequently, the third party's damage award should
be reduced according to the third party's conduct.
175. Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., 758 P.2d 58, 66 (Cal. 1988).
176. See supra notes 72-87 and accompanying text.
177. There are situations when a third party engages in delay and supplies fraudulent
information. As this is taken into account in comparative bad faith analysis when an insured
supplies fraudulent information, the third party should also not benefit from this conduct.
Certain defenses based on the conduct of the third party may be raised by the insurer. These
defenses include the absence of a settlement offer by the third party, the third party's failure to allow
the insurer reasonable time to consider a settlement offer, and the third party's submission of an
incomplete settlement offer. See Merrit v. Reserve Ins. Co., 110 Cal. Rptr. 511 (Ct. App. 1973)
(absence of settlement offer); Critz v. Farmers Ins. Group, 41 Cal. Rptr. 401 (Ct. App. 1964)
(reasonable settlement time); Coe v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 136 Cal. Rptr. 331 (Ct. App.
1977) (incomplete settlement offer); 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 6, §§ 2.46-2.49, 2.50. These
defenses are ineffective because they do not adequately consider the bad faith conduct of the third
party. When an insurer raises these defenses, the third party's damage award is not comparatively
reduced. The third party's bad faith conduct is only considered to determine if the insurer acted in
bad faith. Ronald S. Range, Note, The "Set Up" Defense and the ComparaliveBad Fault Defense:
New Wrinkles in Bad Faith Claims Against Insurers, 45 WASH. & LE. L. REV. 321 (1988). Thus,
the third party's claim is either allowed or precluded. Critz, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 419 (if the third
party's incomplete settlement offer was partly responsible for the insurer's failure to settle, the third
party's claim will be precluded). If the third party's claim is precluded, the injured third party will
not be compensated.
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exists between the insured and the insurer."
CONCLUSION

The development of the bad faith cause of action has given an insured a
method of recovering all damages caused by the insurer's breach of the
insurance policy. However, in California, a third party who is injured by an
insured may not receive compensation from the insurer. The third party will not
be able to sue the insurer based on a common law theory of bad faith because
the duty of good faith and fair dealing is limited to privity relationships and does
not extend to third parties.
In order to fully compensate the third party, a statutory cause of action,
which would circumvent the common law privity requirement, should exist for
the third party. The third party would then be able to sue the insurer for
damages caused by the insurer's failure to settle. The statute proposed by this
Note creates a remedy for the third party. The proposed statute also addresses
liability concerns by limiting a third party's recovery if the third party has acted
unreasonably in presenting information to the insurer. This statute creates a
balance between the insurer and the third party similar to the balance between
the insured and the insurer created by comparative bad faith. In so doing, the
proposed statute will solve the problem of the injured and undercompensated
third party.
CHRISTINA M. L. LASS

178. See supra notes 72-87 and accompanying text. Although the proposed comparative bad
faith defense to operate against the third party is statutory, an analytic basis for it may be found in
tortious interference with contract. The application of tortious interference with contract to the
insurance industry is not new. In Fletcher v. Western National Life Insurance Co., 89 Cal. Rptr.
78 (Ct. App. 1970), an insurer was held liable for wrongfully withholding disability benefits from
an insured. In Fletcher,the insurer wrongfully withheld benefits by intentionally misconstruing the
insured's medical reports. The court awarded damages to the policy holder by analogizing to
tortious interference with contract. The court stated that if a third party had interfered with the
insured's rights under the policy, the third party would be liable to the insured. Thus, the insurer
should be held liable on the same principles. Id. at 91.
The comparative bad faith defense asserted against the third party is based on the relationship
between the third party and the insurer. Although the third party is justified in suing an insurer that
refuses to settle the third party's claim, any bad faith conduct by the third party may be seen as an
interference with the policy between the insured and the insurer. Because the third party has
interfered with the insurance contract, by acting in bad faith, the third party's damages should be
reduced in comparison to the third party's conduct. However, a complete analysis of the interaction
between the principles of tortious interference with contract and a reduction of the third party's
damage award is beyond the scope of this Note.
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